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Abstract
We investigate adaptive strategies to robustly and optimally control the COVID-
19 pandemic via social distancing measures based on the example of Germany.
Our goal is to minimize the number of fatalities over the course of two years
without inducing excessive social costs. We consider a tailored model of the Ger-
man COVID-19 outbreak with different parameter sets to design and validate
our approach. Our analysis reveals that an open-loop optimal control policy
can significantly decrease the number of fatalities when compared to simpler
policies under the assumption of exact model knowledge. In a more realistic
scenario with uncertain data and model mismatch, a feedback strategy that up-
dates the policy weekly using model predictive control (MPC) leads to a reliable
performance, even when applied to a validation model with deviant parameters.
On top of that, we propose a robust MPC-based feedback policy using interval
arithmetic that adapts the social distancing measures cautiously and safely, thus
leading to a minimum number of fatalities even if measurements are inaccurate
and the infection rates cannot be precisely specified by social distancing. Our
theoretical findings support various recent studies by showing that 1) adaptive
feedback strategies are required to reliably contain the COVID-19 outbreak, 2)
well-designed policies can significantly reduce the number of fatalities compared
to simpler ones while keeping the amount of social distancing measures on the
same level, and 3) imposing stronger social distancing measures early on is more
effective and cheaper in the long run than opening up too soon and restoring
stricter measures at a later time.
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Control, Robustness.
✩This work was supported by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research
Foundation) under Grants GRK 2198/1 - 277536708, AL 316/12-2 - 279734922. The authors
thank the International Max Planck Research School for Intelligent Systems (IMPRS-IS) for
supporting Lukas Schwenkel, Anne Koch, Julian Berberich, and Patricia Pauli.
Preprint submitted to Annual Reviews in Control May 8, 2020
1. Introduction
Social distancing is an effective way to contain the spread of a contagious
disease, particularly when little is known about the virus and no vaccines or
other pharmaceutical interventions are available. Social distancing and isolation
(together with other non-pharmaceutical measures such as hygiene and face
masks) have a direct influence on the infection rates and hence on the spread of
the virus [1, 2, 3]. While this combination has proven effective during the last
weeks, e.g. in the German outbreak of COVID-19, strict social distancing is also
very costly in terms of economical and psychological damage, which naturally
leads to a multi-objective decision problem.
There have been numerous approaches to model the COVID-19 outbreak and
to predict future behavior for different distancing policies in simulation studies.
The most commonly used modeling approaches are different extensions of the
SIR (susceptible-infected-removed) model formulated either as system dynamics
or as agent-based simulations (e.g. for Germany [4, 5, 6]). In many such studies,
different policies are simulated and compared with respect to the goals that
both the health care system is not overwhelmed such that every patient in need
receives treatment and the mortality rate is kept low, and also such that the
majority of people can resume social interaction as soon as possible. However,
in line with [7] and others, we advocate to go from mere model predictions to
(model predictive) control, since control generally offers the theory to develop
and apply optimal or robust decision making under uncertainties.
While mathematical modeling and control of epidemics is a topic with rich
history (see, e.g., the survey in [8] and the references therein), there have also
been numerous approaches to apply control theory to the COVID-19 spread.
In [9], the author applies control theoretic principles and insights to a simple
model of the outbreak to point out the difficulties of the system at hand: fast
unstable dynamics with significant delays. In more recent literature, multiple
works have addressed the problem of open-loop optimal control for the COVID-
19 pandemic. In [10, 11], for example, the authors argue in favor of ’on and
off’-policies of the social distancing measures, yielding a bang-bang like optimal
control strategy. Such ’on and off’-policies, where the control input switches
between two states, however, could pose great challenges, amongst others, for
the society, but also for production lines, supply chains and the economy in
general.
In this paper, we propose optimal open-loop and feedback control strategies
to handle the German COVID-19 outbreak. We employ the recently developed
SIDARTHE model [12] in order to design control policies which minimize the
number of fatalities within a time horizon of two years, without using excessive
social distancing measures. We also address robustness of our policies w.r.t.
model and measurement uncertainties via a (robust) model predictive control
(MPC) feedback strategy.
Similar to the setup in this paper, the authors in [13] explore the best policy
to implement while waiting for the availability of a vaccine. In their paper, they
also distinguish between varying severity of symptoms (’mild’ or ’severe’) and
seek a solution to the multi-objective optimization problem of minimizing fatal-
ities and costs due to the implementation of the control strategy itself. Their
main outcome of the open-loop input strategy is qualitatively similar to our
results in Section 3.2: Start with a loose strategy, soon increase all distancing
measures such that the health care system capacities are never extorted and then
relax the social distancing measures gradually and slowly. Another example for
an open-loop optimal policy applied to the COVID-19 pandemic is presented
in [14] where the authors consider optimal control of the German outbreak using
a slightly simpler model as the one chosen in the present paper (without dis-
tinguishing between detected and undetected individuals), which also includes
an increased mortality rate if the ICU capacity is exceeded. Therein, the ob-
jective is not only to minimize the number of fatalities but also the number of
susceptible individuals at the end of the time horizon, thus aiming for herd im-
munity. Our investigations in Section 3, however, indicate that herd immunity
cannot be reached in a reasonable amount of time without overwhelming the
hospital capacities. Therefore, our approach minimizes the number of fatalities
after two years, with the underlying assumption that a vaccine will be available
thereafter.
However, an open-loop optimal policy cannot suffice to control the COVID-
19 pandemic given all the uncertainties in the spreading of the virus and the
disease progression, as we will see in the numerical results. We argue, similar
to [7], that an MPC-based feedback strategy is the right tool to develop opti-
mal and robust social distancing policies, especially in the presence of model
inaccuracies. By using online measurements of the current outbreak, feedback
inherently introduces robustness with respect to uncertainties and disturbances
to the policy. We also robustify the feedback mechanism by introducing a ro-
bust MPC-based feedback strategy for uncertain state measurements which is
crucial in a situation where only a limited amount of data is available and, for
example, the number of the currently infected persons can only be estimated
roughly by applying different studies.
Our results are also in accordance with a very recently published joint strat-
egy paper for Germany by authors from different German research institutions
(Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft, Helmholtz Association, Leibniz Association and Max
Planck Society) [15]. Firstly, they also state that reaching herd immunity with-
out the availability of a vaccine would either exceed the health care capacities
(with a resulting high mortality rate) or take several years (cf. our results in
Section 3). Secondly, they state that the goal of wiping out the virus can only
be a robust solution if this eradication would be a worldwide effort with very
high social and economic costs (cf. our results in Section 3.1.1), which seems
impossible to realize. Finally, they suggest an adaptive strategy for all policies
influencing the infection rates with the goal to keep the spread of COVID-19
at bay while requiring the least possible restraints on the society and econ-
omy. With exactly this reasoning, we develop suitable control approaches in
Section 3.2, Section 4, and Section 5 for such an ’adaptive’ strategy.
To summarize, our key contributions are the following:
• We extend the model in [12] by a mortality rate dependent on the state of
the health care capacity and fit the parameters with data from Germany
(Section 2).
• We develop an optimization problem for finding the optimal input (in
terms of setting infection rates) that minimizes the number of fatalities
while keeping the costs occurring due to distancing measures low (Sec-
tion 3). Moreover, we show that such an optimal input has significant
advantages compared to simpler baseline policies.
• We show that simply applying a precomputed (optimized) input is dan-
gerous if the model is uncertain and explain why feedback is of utmost
importance when dealing with such an unstable and uncertain system.
Further, we demonstrate how such feedback can be incorporated via MPC,
and we showcase the advantages of this control policy (Section 4).
• We develop a robust MPC-based feedback strategy, which takes model
inaccuracies, uncertain state measurements, and inexact inputs into ac-
count and can thus handle the COVID-19 outbreak cautiously and safely
(Section 5).
Although based on a simple model fitted with limited data, we hope that
these high-level insights inspire further investigations, possibly on more complex
epidemiological models, and can ultimately help decision makers to improve and
optimize their policies to mitigate the spread of epidemics while keeping the toll
on the society and economy low.
2. Modeling of the COVID-19 epidemic
In this section, we describe the model of the COVID-19 epidemic that
we use for our subsequent control approach. Our model is adapted from the
SIDARTHE model proposed in [12] with the key differences that (i) we use
more recent data to estimate new parameters to model the German COVID-19
outbreak (in [12], the Italian outbreak was considered) and (ii) we model the fact
that the mortality rate increases if the number of critically ill patients exceeds
the capacity of the German health care system. In Section 2.1, we describe the
model of [12] and explain its ingredients. Thereafter, in Section 2.2, we pro-
vide details on our parameter estimation algorithm which fits the model to the
German COVID-19 outbreak. Finally, we propose an extension of the model
by increasing the mortality rate when the health care system is overwhelmed in
Section 2.3.
2.1. The SIDARTHE model
The considered model based on [12] is shown in Figure 1 and includes eight
states: S - Susceptible, I - Infected (asymptomatic, undetected), D - Di-
agnosed (asymptomatic, detected), A - Ailing (symptomatic, undetected), R
- Recognized (symptomatic, detected), T - Threatened (symptomatic with
life-threatening symptoms, detected), H - Healed (immune after prior infec-
tion, detected or undetected), E - Extinct (dead, detected). In accordance with
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Figure 1: Scheme of the considered model for the COVID-19 epidemic, adapted from [12].
Figure 1, the following differential equations describe the SIDARTHE model:
S˙ = −S(αI + βD + γA+ βR), (1a)
I˙ = S(αI + βD + γA+ βR)− (ǫ+ ζ + λ)I, (1b)
D˙ = ǫI − (ζ + λ)D, (1c)
A˙ = ζI − (θ + µ+ κ)A, (1d)
R˙ = ζD + θA− (µ+ κ)R, (1e)
T˙ = µA+ µR− (σ(T ) + τ(T ))T, (1f)
H˙ = λI + λD + κA+ κR+ σ(T )T, (1g)
E˙ = τ(T )T. (1h)
In the equations (1), capital letters describe fractions of the whole population
that are currently in the respective state. Since the model represents the whole
population, the states sum up to 1, i.e., they must satisfy S + I + D + A +
R + T + H + E = 1 at all times. Therefore, one equation in (1) is redundant
and hence, e.g., the state H can be expressed via the algebraic relation H =
1− (S+I+D+A+R+T +E) instead of Equation (1g), as it is common in the
field of differential algebraic equations. In most parts of this section, we omit
time arguments for simplicity. Further, Greek letters are the model parameters
which are briefly summarized in the following:
• α, β, γ describe the infection rates for susceptible individuals, i.e., the rate
at which susceptible individuals are infected by the states I, D or R, and
A, respectively, and hence join the state I.
• ǫ, θ describe the testing rate, i.e., at which rate (asymptomatic or symp-
tomatic) infected individuals go from undetected to detected.
• ζ describes the rate of asymptomatic (detected or undetected) infected
individuals exhibiting symptoms, i.e., going from states I or D to A or R,
respectively.
• µ is the rate at which infected individuals in A orR develop life-threatening
symptoms, i.e., join the state T .
• λ, κ, σ(T ) are recovery rates for individuals affected by COVID-19. The
recovery rate for threatened individuals σ(T ) depends on T , compare Sec-
tion 2.3.
• τ(T ) is the mortality rate, i.e., the rate at which individuals with life-
threatening symptoms decease, and it depends on T , compare Section 2.3.
Key features of the considered model for the COVID-19 pandemic compared to
simpler ones (e.g., SIR models, compare [16]) are that it distinguishes between
detected and undetected cases, symptomatic and asymptomatic individuals, and
it includes a separate state T for patients with life-threatening symptoms (com-
pare [12] for a more detailed explanation of the key ingredients). The present
model, i.e., Equations (1) as well as Figure 1, is a mild modification of the
model suggested in [12]. First, we reduce the number of parameters by includ-
ing the following assumptions. We assume that the rate for developing (severe)
symptoms is the same for detected and undetected cases, since (to this day)
no effective medication of COVID-19 is known. More precisely, the transitions
from I to A and D to R have the same dynamics with rate ζ, and similarly
for the respective recovery rates as well as for the transitions from A to T and
R to T . Moreover, we assume that the rate β at which susceptible individuals
are infected is the same from states D and R, since the state D is neglected
for the parameter identification step (compare Section 2.2). Finally, as a key
difference to [12], we consider T -dependent rates τ(T ) and σ(T ) for threatened
patients, i.e., the mortality and recovery rates depend on the current number of
threatened patients. Essentially, τ(T ) increases and σ(T ) decreases if T exceeds
the capacity of the German health care system (see Section 2.3 for a detailed
description of this model refinement).
2.2. Parameters for the German outbreak
In this section, we adjust the model parameters and the initial condition
given in [12] to the COVID-19 outbreak in Germany. This is necessary, because
the outbreaks in Germany and Italy evolved differently due to differences in
the testing policy, the testing capacity, the health care system, the reaction of
the governmental authorities, and the underlying counting method of confirmed
cases.
In order to compute realistic parameters for Germany, we will use a prag-
matic approach that enables us to easily include prior knowledge about relations
between parameters. The approach is a least squares optimization of the avail-
able data, where prior knowledge is incorporated via hard constraints in the
optimization problem. The available data is marked by a tilde and is given by:
• the confirmed COVID-19 cases C˜, deaths E˜, and recoveries H˜c from [17],
[18] for the days t ∈ [0, 49] from February 28, 2020 (t = 0) to April 21, 2020
(t = 53). We filtered this data set using the Matlab function kaiser(7,3)
with window length 7 and shape factor 3 to reduce the effect of noise
corruption and having less confirmed cases during weekends. Further,
we have to divide the data set by the total German population Ntotal =
8.3 · 107 to ensure all values are normalized and are in the range [0, 1].
• the COVID-19 patients in ICU T˜2 and how many of them died E˜2 or
recovered H˜2 from [19] for t ∈ [24, 53] from March 23 (t = 24) to April 21
(t = 53).1
This data set, however, is rather small compared to the complexity of the model
(1) consisting of eight states and 13 parameters. Therefore, we need to leverage
additional prior knowledge in order to avoid over-fitting and ensure a realistic
resulting parameter set and initial conditions. Based on other studies and the
interpretation of our model states and parameters, we enforce the following
assumptions.
• The detection rate of asymptomatic cases is negligible, as the German
policy is to test only people showing symptoms [20], i.e., ǫ = 0.
• At February 28, the initial date for our fit, there were 48 confirmed cases,
hence, we assume R(0) = 48/Ntotal, T (0) = D(0) = H(0) = E(0) = 0,
and I(0), A(0), S(0) appear as decision variables with S(0) = 1−R(0)−
I(0)−A(0).
• The test rate θ is approximately constant. Please note that this does not
mean that the absolute number of tests is constant per day, as this value
is rather proportional to θA than to θ.
• The infection rates α and γ were influenced by the countermeasures that
the German authorities installed to fight the spread of the pandemic. Ac-
cording to [4], three main events changed the spreading rates: (1) March 9
- canceling large events, (2) March 16 - closing schools and non-essential
stores, and (3) March 23 - contact ban (Kontaktsperre) that prohibits
1There was no reliable data available from before March 23; the data from March 23 to
March 26 contains only information about T˜2, not E˜2 or H˜2; from April 5 to April 7, there is
a gap in the data due to a server migration of the DIVI Intensivregister [19].
groups of more than two people and requires people to maintain a dis-
tance of at least 1.5m in public. Hence, there are four different policies
ui, i = 1, 2, 3, 4 monotonically increasing from no countermeasures u1 = 0
to full lockdown u4 = 1 resulting in αi = αmax + ui(αmin − αmax) and
γi = γmax + ui(γmin − γmax). This yields the following six decision vari-
ables αmin, αmax, γmin, γmax, u2, and u3.
• One of the main reasons why the COVID-19 pandemic is spreading so fast
is that infectiousness peaks even before the onset of symptoms [21]. As
asymptomatic individuals have no indication of their infection, they are
on top of that also not as cautious as people with symptoms. Therefore,
we require α ≥ γ when searching for realistic parameters. Further, we
want to ensure that people tested positive are significantly less contagious
while in quarantine, such that we require γ ≥ 5β.
• The percentage of confirmed COVID-19 cases is estimated in the study [22]
as 27.32% in Germany. In our model, this value approaches the constant
φ = ζ
λ+ζ
θ+µ
κ+θ+µ , which is the proportion of people that develop symptoms
(I to A, I to D can be ignored as ǫ = 0) and get detected (A to R or T );
that is the percentage of confirmed accumulated cases in a steady state
(I = D = A = R = T = 0). To make sure our model coincides with the
findings of [22], we expect φ to be slightly above of the estimated 27.32%
as a steady state is not reached yet and the proportion of detected cases
increases over time, i.e., we constrain φ ∈ [0.3, 0.45].
• The percentage of asymptomatic disease progressions was estimated at
43% in a population screening study in Iceland [23], at 43.2% in a com-
prehensive testing of the whole municipality of Vo, Italy [24] and at 17.9%
[25] in a study regarding the cruise ship Diamond Princess. To ensure that
our model has a comparable ratio, we add the constraint λ
λ+ζ ∈ [0.18, 0.43]
to the optimization problem.
• The (base) reproduction rate in the beginning of March was estimated as
approximately 3 [26]. Thus, for the parameters αmax, γmax with no active
countermeasures we require R0(αmax, γmax) ∈ [2.5, 3.5] where R0(α, γ) is
given by (see [12] for details)
R0(α, γ) =
1
ζ + λ
(
α+
1
θ + µ+ κ
(
γζ +
δθζ
µ+ κ
))
. (2)
• The median of the incubation time is 5–6 days [27], [28], [29], which we
identify as the half life period a person is in the state I, i.e. log(2)/(λ+ζ) ∈
[5, 6]. Further, the median time from onset of symptoms until intensive
care is 10–11 days [30], [31]. Hence, we constrain the half life period of a
ailing or recognized individuals to log(2)/(κ+ µ) ∈ [10, 11].
In the state H of (1) the confirmed recovered cases are not distinguished
from the undetected ones, thus we define the number of confirmed recovered
A+R T
H
E
µ
σ
τ
⇔ A+R
T1
T2
H
E
µ1
µ2
σ1
σ2
τ1
τ2
Figure 2: The threatened state T is split up in ICU cases T2 and non-ICU cases T1.
cases as Hc, with Hc(0) = 0 and H˙c = ρD + ξR + σ1T1 + σ2T2 and further the
number of confirmed accumulated cases as C = D + R + T +Hc + E in order
to match the data H˜c and C˜. Considering the COVID-19 patients in intensive
care T˜2, a natural choice would be to identify them with threatened state T ,
however, all deaths in the model have been in T before, but in reality only half
to a third of the deaths happens in ICU [18], [19]. Hence, as the patients in ICU
are only a part of T , we split T into T1 and T2, where T2 represents the number
of people in intensive care and T1 are all otherwise threatened COVID-19 cases.
We assume that there are no transitions from T1 to T2 and vice versa, such that
T = T1 + T2 can be modeled as
T˙1 = µ1A+ µ1R (3a)
T˙2 = µ2A+ µ2R (3b)
with µ1+µ2 = µ such that T˙1 =
µ1
µ2
T˙2 and further T1 =
µ1
µ2
T2 =
µ1
µ
T since before
the outbreak it was T1(0) = T2(0) = 0. Therefore, we can ensure σT = σ1T1 +
σ2T2 and τT = τ1T1 + τ2T2 by setting σ =
µ1
µ
σ1 +
µ2
µ
σ2 and τ =
µ1
µ
τ1 +
µ2
µ
τ2.
Hence, we can equivalently transform the more complex model with T1 and T2
into the form described in Section 2.1 as sketched in Figure 2. Further, we
define H2 (E2) to be the numbers of people that recovered (died) from T2.
Finally, we perform the parameter optimization by solving a least squares
problem via CasADi [32] to fit C, E, Hc, T2, E2, H2 to the data C˜, E˜, H˜c,
T˜2, E˜2, H˜2. The best fitting parameters are given in Table 1 and the resulting
fit is shown in Figure 3. Many of the constraints listed above are active at
the optimal set of parameters, e.g., α = γ, which is not surprising since we
use the constraints to keep the parameters in a realistic range without further
regularization.
This fit further enables us to specify the full model state of today x(53) =: x0,
which will be used in the following sections as the initial condition where t = 53
corresponds to April 21
x0 =
1
Ntotal
[
82 636 256 20 581 0 8 041 41 931 11 469 276 911 4 810
]⊤
. (4)
Please note that the model is quite sensitive to changes in the parameters and
one obtains quite different parameter values if, e.g., the estimated range of
αmin = 0.0422 u1 = 0.5816 ζ = 0.0790 µ1 = 0.0080 µ2 = 0.0050
αmax = 0.3614 u2 = 0.7062 λ = 0.0596 σ1 = 0.0370 σ2 = 0.0552
γmin = 0.0422 β = 0.0084 κ = 0.0563 τ1 = 0.0159 τ2 = 0.0242
γmax = 0.3614 θ = 0.1981 I0 = 500/Ntotal A0 = 304/Ntotal
Table 1: The parameters of the model for Germany.
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Figure 3: Simulation of the model (1) with the estimated parameters in Table 1 scaled by
Ntotal compared to the actual data [18], [19]. The horizontal axis represents the time in days,
where t = 1 is February 28 and t = 53 is April 21.
unknown cases or the percentage of asymptomatic cases deviate from the as-
sumptions.
2.3. Modeling of the mortality rate
It has been recognized as a key difficulty in handling the COVID-19 pan-
demic that the virus is highly contagious, thus infecting large numbers of indi-
viduals. In addition, since many elderly and ill people require hospitalization
and/or intensive care [33], large waves of infections can quickly exceed the ca-
pacities of local health care systems [34]. Hence, ensuring that health care
resources are sufficient is a key issue in handling the outbreak [35], given that
an overwhelmed health care system even correlates positively with the mortality
rate [36].
In this section, we describe how the mortality and recovery rates τ(T ) and
σ(T ) in (1) depend on the number of threatened patients T . The basic idea
is that they are constant as long as the health care system’s capacity is not at
its limit, and the mortality rate τ (the recovery rate σ) increases (decreases)
significantly if it is overwhelmed. According to [19], there are (on April 21)
2 908 COVID-19 patients in an ICU and 12 623 ICU spots are available. Hence,
the overall ICU capacity currently available for COVID-19 patients is 2 908 +
12 623 = 15 531, and we define the relative ICU capacity as TICU =
15 531
Ntotal
, where
Ntotal = 8.3 · 10
7. We consider a constant value of TICU for simplicity, although
it is likely that it will further increase in the future.
We assume that the mortality rate increases if the number of individuals
requiring treatment in an ICU exceeds TICU, i.e., if T2 > TICU, with T2 as
in (2). More precisely, we assume that if a patient requiring intensive care does
not receive it, then the patient deceases (i.e., for such patients, the mortality
rate increases and the recovery rate is zero). According to data of deceased
individuals from Italy, those who were not admitted to an ICU deceased in
median within 4 days [37]. Hence, we model those individuals in T2 which are
not admitted to an ICU via decaying first order dynamics with a half-life period
of 4 days, i.e, the corresponding time constant τcrit satisfies e
−4τcrit = 0.5, thus
leading to τcrit = 0.173.
Note that T2 =
µ2
µ
T , compare Section 2.2, and hence we only modify the
mortality rate τ in case that µ2
µ
T > TICU. In the model (1), τ(T ) and σ(T ) only
occur jointly with T , which leads us to the following modification of τ(T )T and
σ(T )T
τ(T )T =
µ1
µ
τ1T +max
{
µ2
µ
τ2T, τ2TICU + τcrit
(
µ2
µ
T − TICU
)}
, (5a)
σ(T )T =
µ1
µ
σ1T + σ2min
{
µ2
µ
T, TICU
}
. (5b)
If µ2
µ
T ≤ TICU, then (5) implies τ(T )T = (
µ1
µ
τ1+
µ2
µ
τ2)T and σ(T )T = (
µ1
µ
σ1+
µ2
µ
σ2)T , i.e., the previous model is recovered as long as the ICU capacity is not
exceeded. If however µ2
µ
T > TICU, then the mortality rate increases to τcrit for
those µ2
µ
T − TICU patients which require intensive care but do not receive it.
Similarly, for this fraction, the recovery rate is set to zero implicitly in (5b).
The individuals T1 =
µ1
µ
T not receiving intensive care are not affected by this
mechanism.
Clearly, the modified rates in (5) are just a simple approximation of the effect
that the mortality rate increases if hospitals are overwhelmed. This modification
in the model is crucial when studying the effect of loosening quarantine measures
and corresponding optimal policies, as done in the remainder of this paper. Since
(fortunately) the German health care system has not been overwhelmed to this
date, there are no quantitative data to validate the above modification and in
particular, the exact value of τcrit. Nevertheless, the refinement is confirmed
qualitatively by experiences in other countries [34, 35, 36]. Moreover, even a
substantial change of τcrit has little effect on the overall dynamics since it only
affects the exact number of fatalities. In particular, changing τcrit does not lead
to a qualitative change in an optimal policy to control the outbreak as long
as τcrit is sufficiently larger than τ2 and it is possible not to exceed the ICU
capacity.
3. Open-loop optimal control of the COVID-19 outbreak
In this section, we discuss different policies that can be considered to keep the
number of fatalities due to COVID-19 low while at the same time also impose
as little constraints as possible on the public. The most significant degree of
freedom currently is certainly influencing the infection rates α and γ. Measures
for influencing the infection rates include hygienic measures, face masks, and
different nuances of distancing policies, up to a mandated lockdown. Therefore,
we define u as introduced in Section 2.2 as our input, representing distancing
policies or other measures that have a direct influence on the infection rates α
and γ. We model this influence via
α(t) = αmax + (αmin − αmax)u(t) (6a)
γ(t) = γmax + (γmin − γmax)u(t), (6b)
where a value of u = 1 hence represents the policies in Germany as of mid April
(lockdown) and u = 0 represents no social distancing or other measures (i.e.
corresponding to infection rates as in the beginning of March). Furthermore,
we assume that the policies affecting the infection rates α, γ (i.e. u) stay
constant for at least one week and can only be changed every seven days. In
the first subsection, we will introduce different baseline policies which can give
insights into the effects of different inputs u and which will serve as a comparison
to the optimal controller in the following subsection. More specifically, these
baseline strategies will be used to define an upper bound on the social distancing
measures that the optimal control in Section 3.2 and later on the feedback
strategies in Sections 4 and 5 can employ to minimize the fatalities.
Test capacity
In addition to varying the infection rates α and γ, another degree of freedom
to influence the model (1) lies in adapting the testing policy. Testing individ-
uals on COVID-19 is represented in the current model by parameters θ and ǫ
for symptomatic and asymptomatic individuals, respectively. In the following,
we assume that only a fixed number of tests can be carried out every day. If
we wish to only test symptomatic individuals, this includes both symptomatic
individuals infected with COVID-19 (i.e., members of the state A) and individ-
uals suffering from other illnesses with similar symptoms. In [38], the Robert
Koch Institute estimates numbers on influenza-like illnesses (ILI) in Germany.
While the numbers show clear seasonal differences, approximately 1.3% of the
population become newly infected with ILI on average per week, and approx-
imately 37% of them see a doctor (an indication for more severe symptoms).
Moreover, influenza symptoms usually last 4-5 days leaving us with an approxi-
mate average of psick = 0.3% of the population showing significant influenza-like
symptoms at an arbitrary time of the year. When testing asymptomatic indi-
viduals, this includes infected persons without symptoms but also any other
individual not known to be infected or healed and not showing any symptoms
(i.e. S + I +H −Hc − psick, where Hc are the confirmed healed cases, compare
Section 2.2). The total amount of resources used for testing is then captured by
the following cost:
ctest(ǫ, θ, A, S, I,H −Hc) = ǫ(S + I +H −Hc − psick) + θ · (A+ psick) +Aµ.
(7)
Denoting the parameter θ from Table 1 as θn, we assume a fixed bound c > 0 on
the amount of resources for testing ctest and that θn corresponds to the nominal
value for A = 0, i.e., c := ctest(0, θn, 0). In the following, we assume that the
current policy with respect to testing stays in place: all available tests are used
on a daily basis for as many symptomatic people as tests are available. Then
the testing policy used throughout this section reads ǫ(t) = 0 (as is current
practice) and
θ(t) = (θn · psick − µA(t))/(psick +A(t)). (8)
Note that this also implies that throughout this paper the state D ≡ 0. The
allocation of tests (with the possibility of also saving test resources for later) can
also be modeled as control inputs. However, in the present model the effects of
temporarily saving tests (under the current resource constraints) are negligible
compared to the effects of changes in the infection rates. Increasing the overall
test capacity or improving the choice of test subjects (e.g. with tracing of
cases), which corresponds to increasing values of θn/c, on the other hand, can
potentially improve the evolution of the pandemic significantly, since detected
individuals are less contagious than undetected ones. However, increasing test
capacities or better allocated testing (especially with regard to ǫ, i.e. tracing
of also asymptomatic infections) is at the current stage not included in our
consideration but could be addressed in future work with the presented model
by choosing ǫ 6= 0 and making θn/c an increasing and time-varying variable.
Control goal
Given the introduced control input u, different control goals can be for-
mulated. One such goal could be to obtain herd immunity. Herd immunity
corresponds to the only stable equilibrium given no social distancing measures
(i.e. with αmax, γmax) and requires a large part of the society to be immune.
More precisely, herd immunity is reached if S < S⋆, where [12] provide a for-
mula for calculating S⋆ (see Section 3.1.1 for more details). Given our model,
we can now calculate the minimum time that is needed to reach herd immunity.
For this, we assume that we can choose a policy that utilizes the full health care
capacity at all times. With T ≡ µ
µ2
TICU, T˙ ≡ 0, A˙ + R˙ ≡ 0, I˙ + D˙ ≡ 0, S
decreases each day by (ζ+λ)(µ+κ)(σ+τ)
ζµ
µ
µ2
TICU. Hence,
therd =
ζµ2(1− S
⋆)
(ζ + λ)(µ+ κ)(σ + τ)TICU
gives a lower bound on the time required to reach herd immunity without exceed-
ing the health care capacity given the introduced model. The herein identified
model parameters yield a time span therd of more than six years. A stable steady
state in the absence of a vaccine (i.e. herd immunity) can hence only be ob-
tained either after many years or by overstraining the health care system and a
corresponding significant rise in the number of fatalities. Therefore, our ongoing
assumption throughout this section is that prior to herd immunity, a vaccine
will be available and we assume the availability of the vaccine in approximately
two years. Our goal is thus to find an optimal policy minimizing the number of
fatalities for the next two years while imposing as little constraints as possible
on the public and the economy.
In the next subsection, we simulate and discuss the following policies:
1. Keeping the social distancing measures in place (or even increasing the
measures) until the virus is eradicated in Germany
2. Slowly (or more aggressively) loosening the distancing measures without
overwhelming the health care capacities (while possibly risking a second
wave).
In fact, the presented baseline policies are similar to the policies suggested by
the German ”Helmholtz-Initiative” in [39]. We will discuss our conclusions in
comparison to theirs at the end of the section.
In Section 3.2, we will then improve these baseline policies by applying op-
timal control techniques and we will discuss the importance and significance of
the improvements.
3.1. Introducing different baseline policies
3.1.1. Consistent lockdown
In the following, we argue that a consistent lockdown strategy necessitates
strong lockdown measures over a long time horizon to fully eradicate the virus
as otherwise, dropping the social distancing measures too early leads to a second
outbreak wave.
Based on the SIDARTHE model fitted to the German outbreak, described
in Section 2.1, we simulate how long we would need to remain in lockdown and
simply wait for the virus to disappear. We define the disappearance of the virus
as follows: If - most probably - there is less than one active contagious case,
i.e., I + D + A + R + T < 0.5/Ntotal, the virus is eradicated. It takes 305
days, which is almost one year, until this condition is fulfilled and clearly the
economical and psychological damage caused by a lockdown period this long
is excessive such that staying and waiting in lockdown is not an option. With
even stricter measures, such as α3 = 0.8α3, γ3 = 0.8γ3, we could only marginally
accelerate this process to 288 days while increasing social distancing is costly, cf.
the cost function in Section 3.2. Note that the equilibrium attained under the
above lockdown policy is an unstable one that is not robust to uncertainties. In
particular, if only one person remains infected when the measures are suspended
they could cause a new outbreak. Also, the virus may be reimported from other
countries or humans might be reinfected by an interim host.
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Figure 4: Simulation of the model (1) for a consistent lockdown of different lengths Tl,i with
days on the horizontal axis (Tl,1 = 0 - blue, solid; Tl,2 = 50 - red, dash-dotted; Tl,3 = 150 -
yellow, dashed).
Next, we simulate the following three scenarios in all of which the German
population is kept in lockdown for a predefined period of time, followed by
no measures at all. The only difference is the length of the lockdown period.
In the first scenario, the measures are abolished immediately (April 21). The
second one keeps the current strict measures for an additional 50 days. The
third variant simulates an even longer lockdown period, ending after 150 days
counting from April 21.
In Figure 4, we compare the three scenarios. We clearly see that in all three
cases the number of currently infected people I+D+A+R+T rises drastically a
few days after the measures are removed independent of how long the lockdown
persisted before. In any case, we experience a second outbreak wave. Staying
longer in lockdown slightly delays the following peak of the share of active cases
I + D + A + R + T , yet the peak amplitude is almost the same in all three
scenarios.
This behavior can be explained as follows. If there is no one who currently
has the virus, i.e., Ieq = Deq = Aeq = Req = Teq = 0, such that Seq + Heq +
Eeq = 1, an equilibrium point is attained. The stability of the equilibrium
point depends on the value of Seq and the model parameters. In [12], the
authors show that the IDART subsystem is asymptotically stable if and only if
Seq < S
⋆, where Seq is the susceptible state at equilibrium for a given initial
condition x0 and the corresponding parameters, especially for α and γ that are
actively adjusted according to an underlying policy. The value of S⋆ follows from
the stability analysis of the linearized IDART subsystem and has the following
structure with respect to α and γ
S⋆ =
a1
αa2 + γa3 + a4
, (9)
where ai, i = 1 . . . 4 are constants, see [12] for details and the definition of S
⋆.
Note further that the commonly stated base reproduction rate (2) is directly
linked to the value S⋆ via R0 = 1/S
⋆. The stability of an equilibrium that
depends on the parameters changes once we adjust α and γ. For strict measures
(αmin, γmin), the value S
⋆ is high (S⋆ = 2.242), such that a stable equilibrium is
attained for any S. This means that only a small number of people is infected
by the virus before the equilibrium is attained. With no measures (αmax, γmax),
a stable equilibrium requires the share of susceptible people to be smaller than
S⋆ = 0.292, i.e., herd immunity.
We can hence conclude that if Seq(x0, α3, γ3) > S
⋆(α0, γ0), the equilibrium
attained during lockdown is unstable with no measures. This means, there
inevitably is a second outbreak wave once the lockdown ends. For the fitted
model of the German outbreak, Seq(x0, α3, γ3) = 0.9956 is attained after the
first wave. Hence, at least another 70.4% of the German population get infected
in the second wave before a stable equilibrium is attained. Altogether, this
leaves us with the following conclusion of two possible outcomes when choosing
a consistent lockdown strategy:
• Strong lockdown measures over long time horizons have to be taken to
eradicate the virus in Germany. However, this takes a big toll on the
public and any infected person, e.g. from abroad, could spark a second
wave at any point.
• Any lockdown strategy that does not fully wipe out the virus inevitably
yields a second outbreak wave once all measures are suspended.
3.1.2. Iterative loosening of the distancing policies
As argued in the previous subsection, keeping the lockdown policy strict
can never lead to a stable equilibrium when ending the lockdown, no matter
how long it did take place before all measures were suspended. Hence, many
countries are now discussing or have even already started to loosen the lock-
down in very small steps. Indeed, experts consulting the German government
(”Nationale Akademie der Wissenschaften Leopoldina”) have recently published
their recommendations concerning a possible strategy for loosening the lockdown
gradually in small steps [40].
They name the following conditions for looseing the lockdown in small steps:
a) The number of new infections remains at a low value.
b) The capacity of the health care system must not be exceeded.
c) Precautions (such as hygienic measures, face masks, distancing) remain in
force.
In the following, we try to translate these recommendations into a policy
for our simplified model to first analyze the results and second, to use this as a
baseline policy for the optimizer in the following subsection. We implement the
conditions presented above via the following policy strategy:
a) u can only be decreased if, over the last nstab days, the number of newly
infected persons (i.e. S(t − 1) − S(t)) is decreasing and u has not been
increased
b) u can only be decreased if less than Xlower of the ICUs are occupied
c) The decrease in u can only be a small decrease at a time and therefore,
the interval between umax = 1 (lockdown) and umin = 0 (no measures) is
divided into nsteps equidistant steps.
Additionally, we add that u will be increased again (with the same step size as
the decrease) if more than Xupper of the ICUs are occupied and no decrease in
the amount of necessary ICU is witnessed. This policy results in four ’tuning
parameters’ of the policy: nstab, Xlower, Xupper and nsteps. In fact, it turns out
that the outcome of the simulation is not very sensitive to the tuning parameters
of the policy, but can be tuned to be slightly more careful or more aggressive. In
the following subsection, we choose two different sets of parameters as baseline
policies for the optimal control approach.
3.2. Optimal control strategy
In this section, we contrast the baseline policy from Section 3.1.2 with an
optimal control policy, under idealized assumptions (exact model and state mea-
surement). The purpose of this section is twofold: a) Understand how an opti-
mal policy differs qualitatively from the baseline policies. b) Quantify the loss
of performance (in terms of increased fatalities and/or unnecessary social policy
u) resulting from using a suboptimal baseline policy. The degree of freedom is
the input u ∈ [0, 1] affecting the social policy and we consider the fact that the
policy can only be changed every Ts = 7 days.
Multi-objective optimal control problem
In the following, we consider the problem only for the next N = 100 weeks,
assuming that thereafter a vaccine might be developed that would ideally pre-
vent (almost all) further fatalities in the future. The overall control problem
can be seen as a multi-objective optimal control problem, where we wish to
simultaneously minimize the number of fatalities E and the societal and ecom-
ical cost of the social policy measures, which will be measured by the function
cpolicy(u) = 1/α(u). We point out that due to the parametrization (6) this cost
also inherently considers the infection rate γ. This cost function is such that the
social cost of achieving an arbitrarily small infection rate α grows unbounded,
while for large values of u incremental differences are less relevant. In order
to suitably characterize an optimal solution to this multi-objective problem we
use the baseline policies in Section 3.1. The resulting optimal control problem
is given by (11) below, which will be explained in the following. In particular,
our goal is to find an input policy that minimizes the number of accumulated
fatalities, while having using less resources than the baseline policy in terms of
accumulated social impact of cpolicy (c.f. (11d)). We point out that similar “sta-
bilization” problems subject to resource constraints for the control of epidemic
outbreaks can be found in the literature, also using a fractional cost cpolicy,
compare e.g. [41, 42].
When minimizing the number of accumulated fatalities, it is important to
consider not only the extinct individuals E(N · Ts) at the end of the two year
horizon, but to account as well for the part of the already infected individuals
that will decease after the two year horizon. The reason for this is, while
the availability of a vaccine at the end of the horizon might prevent future
infections, it cannot cure already infected people. Hence, if we do not account
for the inevitable fatalities among the individuals infected at the end of the
prediction horizon, the optimal controller does not take any efforts to keep
them low and as a result a lot of people would die shortly after the two year
horizon. Therefore, we propose an optimization objective that includes all past
and inevitable future fatalities. Based on the model (1), we know that a total of
ζ
ζ+λ(I+D) of the infected people I+D will develop symptoms in the future and
further that a total of µ
µ+κ
(
ζ
ζ+λ(I+D)+A+R)
)
will become threatened. Thus,
assuming the capacity TICU is not exceeded afterwards, i.e., setting constant
values τ = τ(0) = µ1
µ
τ1 +
µ2
µ
τ2 and σ = σ(0) =
µ1
µ
σ1 +
µ2
µ
σ2, the amount of
inevitable fatalities is exactly given by
F = E +
τ
τ + σ
(
µ
µ+ κ
(
ζ
ζ + λ
(I +D) +A+R
)
+ T
)
. (10)
Hence, given a baseline solution ub, xb from Section 3.1.2, the corresponding
optimal control problem reads as follows:
min
u(·)
F (N · Ts) (11a)
0 ≤ u(k · Ts) ∈ [0, 1] (11b)
k = 0, . . .N − 1 (11c)
N−1∑
k=0
cpolicy(u(k · Ts)) ≤
N−1∑
k=0
cpolicy(u
b(k · Ts)). (11d)
Since we only change the policy every week, the index k in (11) corresponds
to weeks and F (N · Ts) corresponds to the objective function in (10), where
the states result from simulating the system (1) with the parameters and the
initial condition from Section 2 and the input u(·) over k-weeks. Condition (11d)
ensures that the encountered social cost is smaller than the cost of the baseline
policy. This optimal control problem is such that the baseline policy u = ub is a
feasible solution and thus the resulting fatalities F (N · Ts) will always be lower
than that of the baseline policy. We point out that it is possible to consider a
more restrictive transient constraint on the policy cost instead of (11d), which
0 200 400 600
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
105
0 200 400 600
0
5
10
15
104
0 200 400 600
0
1
2
3
4
104
0 200 400 600
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Figure 5: Optimal control strategy (blue, solid), baseline policy (red, dashed) and ICU capac-
ity (dotted, black).
is discussed in detail in Appendix B. The optimal control problem (11) can
be formulated as a nonlinear program (NLP) and is subsequently solved using
CasADi [32].
Numerical results
For comparison and to implement the constraint (11d), we use the baseline
policy from Section 3.1.2 with Xlower = 0.4, Xupper = 0.7, nsteps = 14, nstab =
14, which overall is rather cautious and does not exceed the ICU capacity. The
corresponding results for the baseline policy and the optimal control strategy
can be seen in Figure 5. Although the optimal control input yields initially (first
100 days) a slightly larger number of infected individuals and thus slightly more
fatalities in the first 200 days, the number of infected individuals is subsequently
significantly lower and the overall number of fatalities is reduced to only 26%.
The optimal controller allows for a smooth increase of the infection rate α,
while keeping the number of threatened individuals (T ) consistently below the
corresponding value of the baseline policy after the first 200 days, thus yielding
a small number of fatalities. The rising number of infected individuals (I) at the
end results from the finite-horizon and will be considered later in more detail.
We also consider a second baseline policy using Xlower = 0.6, Xupper =
0.85, nsteps = 12, nstab = 14, which slightly relaxes the social policy, but also
exceeds the ICU capacity. The result is shown in Figure 6. We can see that
in comparison to this second baseline policy the optimal policy significantly
reduces the number of fatalities to only 39%. The optimal strategy is a lot more
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Figure 6: More aggressive baseline: Optimal control strategy (blue, solid), baseline policy
(red, dashed) and ICU capacity (dotted, black).
cautious in reducing the social policy, while the baseline is more aggressive and
goes back and forth between increasing and decreasing α, resulting in significant
violations of the ICU capacity. Furthermore, the simple baseline policy results
in a second wave as the restrictions are loosened too quickly, while the optimal
strategy slowly but steadily increases α after the first 200 days, and thereby
avoids a second wave.
In both examples, a further observation should be highlighted. After an
initial phase of containing the outbreak, the measures are slowly but steadily
relaxed until a larger release at the end of the horizon. Similar behavior can
be observed for many optimal control problems with finite horizons and is com-
monly referred to as “turnpike” behavior, which goes back to [43]. An explana-
tion for this is that the consequences of decisions taken at later points in time
mainly occur after the end of the horizon, such that a more aggressive policy
towards the end is optimal, when only considering the finite two year horizon.
Of course, one would not implement the “leaving arc” if the development of a
vaccine would not be finalized after two years, since implementing such a policy
may lead to an uncontrollable increase of infections towards the end of the time
horizon in case that the model is inaccurate and should thus be avoided in prac-
tice. In Appendix A, we therefore discuss how adding “terminal constraints”
to the optimization problem can prevent this turnpike behavior of the optimal
solution, at the price of an increasing number of fatalities.
3.3. Discussion
If we compare the results in Section 3.2 with the consistent full lockdown
from Section 3.1.1, we can see that it is possible to appropriately increase α with-
out exceeding the ICU capacities, while the consistent full lockdown strategy
would require a lockdown that takes approximately a year to be effective. Hence,
while a consistent lockdown can effectively minimize the number of deaths, this
strategy is only viable in case this lockdown can be prolonged over the corre-
sponding time horizon, unless a vaccine is developed earlier. On the other hand,
both the optimal controller and the baseline controller allow for a significant re-
laxation of the lockdown (on average a doubling of α), without significantly
increasing the number of fatalities.
In comparison to the baseline policy suggested in Section 3.1.2, the optimal
control policy results in a slower but smooth loosening of the distancing poli-
cies. Without increasing the social cost over the full time horizon, this optimal
policy avoids any violation of the maximum ICU capacity and hence results in
a significantly smaller fatality rate. We point out that the resulting optimal
policy of slowly increasing α is qualitatively similar to the resulting optimal
policy in [14], albeit for a different control goal. It can be seen that an ini-
tially “stronger” lockdown (i.e., a smaller value of α) over a longer time period
with subsequent loosening leads to a better handling of the pandemic, com-
pared to repeated tightening and loosening of distancing measures. Moreover,
a smooth and monotone loosening of distancing policies is also desirable from
an economic aspect since repeated lockdowns after interim-periods of relaxed
distancing guidelines may be even more damaging to the economy, compared to
an initially longer lockdown.
Comparing our results with the proposed scenarios by the Helmholtz As-
sociation [39], we find that we agree that the goal of herd immunity without
overwhelming the health care capacity would require years. Our results further
agree with [39] that the contact restrictions can only be loosened slowly if the
health care capacity must not be overwhelmed. However, since the authors in
[39] do not consider the availability of a vaccine, their conclusion is keeping or
even increasing the lockdown until the number of infected persons is small and
all infections can be traced efficiently and effectively via strategically allocated
(and increased) testing. With the assumption of a vaccine within the next two
years, we argue that a slow and smooth loosening of the lockdown does not lead
to many more fatalities while decreasing the social and economic cost signifi-
cantly according to our model. Concurrently, increased and strategically better
allocated testing, e.g., via a contact tracing mobile app [44], is of course highly
beneficial and greatly advisable to improve the performance (even if it this was
not accounted for in our model).
To summarize, it seems possible to reduce the current restrictions and thus
allow α to increase without exceeding the ICU capacity. Furthermore, optimized
policies can significantly improve the outcome (in terms of fewer deaths and/or
less social restrictions). However, the result is highly sensitive w.r.t. the change
in the infection rate, while an accurate control of the infection rate α (e.g. ±5%)
through governmental policies seems difficult/unrealistic. In the next section,
we will therefore deal with these issues by formulating a robust control strategy
that takes uncertainty in our COVID-19 model into account and uses feedback
based on uncertain state information.
4. Optimal feedback control of the COVID-19 outbreak
Section 3.2 shows that an optimal control policy can significantly reduce
the number of fatalities compared to a baseline policy that allows for iterative
loosening of social distancing measures. This optimal control policy is computed
by optimizing over all possible policies to find the one minimizing the number of
fatalities predicted by the model equations (1) without using stronger shutdown
measures than the baseline. Hence, the policy proposed in Section 3.2 strongly
relies on the accuracy of the model identified in Section 2 and thus may fail to
effectively control the outbreak in case of a model mismatch. However, such a
model mismatch is inevitable in practice, especially since the model itself is a
simplification of a much more complex reality and the identification outlined in
Section 2.2 strongly depends on the (sparse) available data and the additional
prior knowledge based e.g. on further studies concerning COVID-19, which also
provide only estimates. In addition, the optimal control policy relies on exact
knowledge of all states and on the assumption that values for α and γ can be
exactly imposed up to arbitrary precision via social distancing measures, both
of which are unrealistic assumptions when applying the policy in practice.
In this section, we show how online measurements can be utilized via feed-
back to effectively and robustly control the German COVID-19 outbreak in the
presence of uncertain parameters. More precisely, we illustrate that the optimal
open-loop policy of Section 3.2 may lead to poor performance when applied to
validation models with a different set of parameters, although these validation
models result from adjusting only one prior assumption in the identification and
still fit the past data well. On the other hand, we show that a model predictive
control (MPC) feedback strategy, based on repeatedly computing an open-loop
policy for the nominal model from Section 2, is inherently robust w.r.t. model
inaccuracies and successfully handles the outbreak.
Basic idea
At each time step k = 1, . . . , N , where k corresponds to weeks and N = 100
as in Section 3.2, we solve the optimization problem (11) over the time horizon
k, . . . , N using the current measurements as initial condition at week k. Then,
we apply the computed optimal policy over one week before solving the problem
for the new measurements again. In this way, since the initial conditions in
the optimal control problem are updated, a feedback mechanism is included
as is standard in MPC [45]. As a result, the prediction horizon N − k of the
optimization problem is shrinking with each time step k, such that it never
exceeds the considered total time horizon of N = 100 weeks, after which we
assume the availability of a vaccine. Hence, since the constraint (11d) needs to
hold over the whole time horizon N , we replace it by
N−1∑
j=k
cpolicy(u(j · Ts)) ≤ c
1
policy −
k−1∑
j=0
cpolicy(u(j · Ts)), (12)
with c1policy =
∑N−1
k=0 cpolicy(u
b(k · Ts)) being the cost of the first baseline policy
in Section 3.1.2. As a second modification, we adapt the bound on the social
distancing cost online, depending on the predicted states, as is detailed in the
following.
Online adaptation of social policy constraint
In Section 3.2, we proposed an open-loop optimal control strategy, where
the inputs were the infection rates α and γ. Loosely speaking, the control goal
was to achieve a minimum number of fatalities without imposing stronger so-
cial distancing measures than a simple baseline policy (compare (11d)). Since
this constraint heavily depends on the model to which the baseline is applied, a
realistic setting with imperfect model knowledge should allow to adapt the con-
straints on the policy online in case that the nominal model is overly optimistic
or pessimistic. Instead of simply requiring that the cost of the MPC-based
feedback cannot exceed c1policy, we increase the maximum cost in case that the
predicted number of patients requiring intensive care lies above 90% of the max-
imum capacity TICU at least once during the horizon, and we decrease it in case
that the number consistently lies below 10% of TICU. This adaption is natu-
ral, as in reality one would increase the efforts to contain the outbreak if the
current measures are insufficient, and on the other hand, the population cannot
be expected to accept strict measures when there are only few (severe) cases
across the country. Therefore, the maximum cost in week k, denoted by cb(k),
varies online with k and is initialized as cb(0) = c
1
policy. The amount by which
we change cb online is ±∆u
N−k
N
, where ∆u =
1
αmin
− 1
αmax
with αmin and αmax
as in Section 2.2. If, for instance, the model predicts large numbers of future
ICU patients, then the cost bound cb is increased by the difference between the
minimum and the maximum social distancing cost, scaled by the remaining time
horizon. This increase corresponds to the social cost of an additional week in
full lockdown, scaled by the remaining time horizon via the factor N−k
N
.
MPC-based feedback strategy
The proposed MPC-based feedback strategy is summarized in Algorithm 1.
In the algorithm, T (j ·Ts | k·Ts) denotes the number of threatened individuals at
time j·Ts, predicted by the optimal solution of (11) at time k·Ts. Essentially, the
algorithm repeatedly applies the open-loop optimal control policy of Section 3.2
with the key difference that, at time k, all past measurements j = 1, . . . , k
are used in the optimization problem, thus including an online feedback. In
addition, in Step 3 of the algorithm, the social policy constraints is adapted as
described above.
Algorithm 1. MPC-based feedback strategy
1. Given state measurements up to time k, solve the following problem
min
u(·)
F (N · Ts) (13a)
0 ≤ u(j · Ts) ∈ [0, 1] (13b)
j = k, . . . , N − 1 (13c)
N−1∑
j=k
cpolicy(u(j · Ts)) ≤ cb(k)−
k−1∑
j=0
cpolicy(u(j · Ts)), (13d)
with the state-dependent cost F as in (10), based on simulating the
model (1) over the remaining horizonN−k subject to the input u, starting
at the current measured state at time k.
2. Apply the optimal policy u∗(k · Ts) for the next Ts = 7 days.
3. Update the social policy cost as
cb(k + 1) =


cb(k) + ∆u
N−k
N
if µ2
µ
maxj∈[k,N ] T (j · Ts | k · Ts) ≥ 0.9TICU
cb(k)−∆u
N−k
N
if µ2
µ
maxj∈[k,N ] T (j · Ts | k · Ts) ≤ 0.1TICU
cb(k) otherwise
where ∆u =
1
αmin
− 1
αmax
.
4. Set k = k + 1.
Validation
To assess the improved robustness of Algorithm 1 compared to open-loop
optimal control, we produce two validation models. More precisely, we identify
two new sets of parameters A and B by proceeding exactly as in Section 2.2 with
the only difference that we change the prior assumption that the stationary
ratio of confirmed COVID-19 cases is in the interval [0.3, 0.45]. Instead, we
assume that this value is in [0.3, 0.6] for set A and in [0.3, 0.4] for set B. When
performing parameter identification based on these modified prior assumptions,
we also obtain sets of parameters that can accurately explain the existing past
data on COVID-19 cases in Germany. However, the resulting models have
different dynamics and different reproduction rates for the same lockdown policy.
Increasing the above ratio as in parameter set A decreases the number of infected
and undetected individuals resulting in a higher reproduction rate to explain
the same amount of confirmed cases. Hence, if an open-loop policy based on
the nominal model (i.e., with parameters described in Section 2.2) is applied
to the validation model with parameters A, then the number of infections and
thus the number of fatalities increases significantly.
To illustrate this effect, we apply the open-loop optimal control policy based
on the model with parameters as in Section 2.2 to the new models with param-
eter sets A and B. The control effort of this policy, i.e., the amount of social
distancing, is constrained as in (11d) by the cost of the baseline policy when
applied to the nominal model identified in Section 2.2. The results for the model
with parameters A can be seen in Figure 7. Since this validation model has a
higher reproduction rate for similar inputs as explained above, the number of
fatalities after N = 100 weeks increases significantly compared to the simula-
tions in Section 3. This is due to the fact that the open-loop policy is only
computed once, at the beginning of the time horizon, and is then applied over
the whole time span of two years without any online adaption based on new
measurements. Therefore, it cannot handle the model mismatch and thus has a
significantly worse performance. In addition, Figure 7 shows the evolution under
the proposed MPC-based feedback, which leads to a significantly lower number
of fatalities compared to the open-loop policy. We point out that the feedback
(partially) compensates the fact that the control action is computed based on
the nominal model parameters from Section 2.2, which differ significantly from
parameter set A. Due to the larger number of infected individuals, the maxi-
mum social cost cb is increased at multiple time steps, which is indicated by
the step-like increases of the input. Finally, an open-loop optimal control pol-
icy is computed which is allowed to use the same amount of resources as the
MPC-based feedback (in hindsight), i.e., the adapted social and economical cost
cb(N). While this policy performs better than the initial open-loop policy with
fewer resources, it leads to a similar number of fatalities at the end of the hori-
zon compared to the feedback controller. However, the number of threatened
patients is very large at time k = N , which would lead to a significant increase
in fatalities after the considered time period, even if a vaccine is available.
Figure 7 also shows the same comparison for the model with parameter set
B. In this case, since the reproduction rate is lower, the open-loop optimal policy
leads to fewer fatalities than in Section 3.2. The MPC-based feedback leads to
almost identical performance, but it reduces the cost budget at several time
instants, i.e., it can handle the outbreak similarly well but with significantly
lower social and economic costs. When restricting the budget of the open-loop
optimal policy to the one of the feedback strategy, i.e., cb(N), then it leads to
a dramatic increase in fatalities.
To conclude, the above discussion reveals that a combination of open-loop
optimal control with feedback is inherently robust in the sense that it effec-
tively controls the German COVID-19 outbreak even if the employed model
is inaccurate. When comparing the result to an open-loop strategy, then the
MPC-based feedback strategy can dramatically decrease the number of fatalities
or the necessary amount of social distancing, respectively. Such robustness is an
important property for applying any control strategy in a real-world scenario,
where accurate model knowledge is rarely available. In the next section, we
propose a more systematic robust MPC approach which explicitly takes model
inaccuracies as well as uncertain state measurements and control inputs into
account in order to safely and cautiously control the COVID-19 pandemic.
5. Robust and optimal feedback control of the COVID-19 outbreak
While the MPC-based feedback policy proposed in Section 4 is significantly
more successful in handling the outbreak compared to a simple open-loop policy,
it relies on the assumption that exact measurements of the state in (1) are
available at each time step. In this section, we consider a more realistic scenario
of uncertain measurements in terms of biased state estimates, and we analyze the
impact on the closed-loop operation. In particular, we develop a robust MPC-
based feedback strategy using interval arithmetic that takes the uncertainty into
account during the predictions and thus leads to a safer policy minimizing the
number of fatalities.
Biased state measurements
In the following, we consider the case where at each day k instead of the
true state x(k) we only obtain an estimated state xˆ(k), which is subject to
an additional bias. In Table 2, we summarize the uncertainties in the states.
For individuals in states D and R, the disease COVID-19 was detected by
tests. Hence, their values are well known, nevertheless, we assume that they
can slightly differ from the true states by ±1%, as there might be cases on the
borderline between D and R that are hard to assign to either of the states. The
number of people in ICUs is well documented. However, the state T contains
not only patients in ICUs (TICU ± 1%) but also other infected members of
the risk group (T2 ± 5%), cf. Section 2.1, such that the uncertainty we use
is ±(µ1
µ
· 1% + µ2
µ
· 5%). We assume that the number of deaths is certain by
±1% as it includes some people that died of different causes. As the undetected
cases can by definition not be measured, they must be estimated using random
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Figure 7: Different policies designed based on the nominal model identified in Section 2.2,
applied to the validation model with parameter set A (top) and parameter set B (bottom):
Open-loop optimal control strategy (’OL’, blue dotted), Open-loop optimal control strategy
with the same amount of resources as the MPC-based feedback (’OL-resource’, red dashed),
MPC-based feedback strategy as in Algorithm 1 (yellow solid), and ICU capacity (black
dotted).
I ± 50% D ± 1% A± 20% R± 1% H ± 50% E ± 1%
T ± (µ1
µ
· 1%+ µ2
µ
· 5%)
Table 2: Uncertainties in the states.
sampling or strategies like [22]. Therefore, the states I and A are much less
certain, especially without symptoms (I ± 50%, A± 20%). Recovering from the
disease is a resulting state from both rather certain states, D and R, and highly
uncertain states, I and A such that overall it is uncertain itself (H± 50%). The
uncertainty of the state of susceptible persons S results from the other states:
Sˆ = xˆ1 = 1−
∑8
i=2 xˆi.
It is possible to directly use this biased state estimate xˆ(k) in Algorithm 1
and compensate the bias through the inherent robustness in the feedback im-
plementation. In the following, we derive an alternative robust formulation that
explicitly considers the uncertainty in the prediction.
Interval predictions
First, given a biased state estimate xˆ(k) and known bounds on the bias
(Tab. 2), it is possible to compute interval bounds x(k), x(k) such that the true
state is guaranteed to lie in that interval, i.e., xi(k) ∈ [xi(k), xi(k)]. The follow-
ing formulation will predict the interval bounds xi and xi instead of using some
nominal prediction. This methods is similar to interval arithmetic employed in
robust MPC [46] and the robust moment enclosure for an SEIV epidemic model
in [47]. Using the fact that the system is positive (xi and all the parameters are
positive), it is possible to derive an interval prediction of the form
x˙ =f(x, x, u), (14a)
x˙ =f(x, x, u), (14b)
which ensures that x(0) ∈ [x(0), x(t)] implies x(t) ∈ [x(t), x(t)] for all t ≥ 0,
given suitable bounds on the uncertain parameters in the system model (1).
The detailed derivation of the interval prediction model (14) can be found
in Appendix C (more precisely, Equations (C.4)). Since deriving reliable bounds
on all parameters in the model (1) is rather difficult or unnecessarily complex,
we only focus on the uncertainty associated with the infection rate α. In par-
ticular, we consider an uncertainty of ±5% on the infection rate α. Thereby,
we explicitly consider the problem that the infection rate cannot be precisely
specified via social distancing measures. We will see later in the simulations
that, although we do not account for all possible mismatches in the prediction
model, we nevertheless obtain the desired properties in closed loop.
Given this interval prediction model, the proposed robust formulation now
predicts an interval for the different state variables and minimizes the worst-case
number of fatalities F based on x(N ·Ts). The overall procedure is summarized
in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2. Robust MPC strategy using interval arithmetic
1. Given biased state estimate xˆ(k · Ts), compute set [x(k · Ts), x(k · Ts)].
2. Solve the following problem
min
u(·)
F (N · Ts) (15a)
0 ≤ u(j · Ts) ∈ [0, 1] (15b)
j = k, . . . N − 1 (15c)
N−1∑
j=k
cpolicy(u(j · Ts)) ≤ cb(k)−
k−1∑
j=0
cpolicy(u(j · Ts)), (15d)
with F based on (10) using x, which results from the interval predictions
of the model (14) over the emaining horizon N − k subject to the input
u, starting at the current set estimate [x(k · Ts), x(k · Ts)].
3. Apply the optimal policy u∗(k · Ts) for the next Ts = 7 days.
4. Update the social policy cost as in Algorithm 1 using T instead of T .
5. Set k = k + 1.
Numerical results
In the following simulations, we consider the extreme case where the number
of estimated infected or previously infected individuals (I, D, A, R, T , H , E)
is underestimated. The results for the robust MPC and the nominal MPC
in comparison to open-loop optimal control strategies for the two validation
parameter sets A and B (compare Section 4) can be seen in Figure 8. Due to
the worst-case prediction in the robust MPC, at t = 0 the robust MPC already
increases the resources two times, for both parameter sets, such that at t = Ts
the predictions satisfy µ1
µ2
T (k · Ts) ≤ 0.9TICU .
In the simulation with the model based on parameter set A, we can directly
see that both the nominal MPC and the robust MPC reduce the number of
fatalities compared to an open-loop optimal control strategy. Furthermore, if
we compare the robust MPC and the nominal MPC, we can see that after t = 140
days the nominal MPC implementation realizes that the spread is worse than
initially assumed. This leads to a strong increase in social measures u at t = 140.
With the robust formulation, u decreases almost monotonically. Furthermore,
the nominal implementation results in twice the number of fatalities, while the
applied resources cpolicy over the two year horizon differ by less than ∆u, which
corresponds to one week of lockdown. This indicates that the robust MPC,
planning cautiously from the beginning, exploits its resources more efficiently
by imposing stricter social distancing measures early on, which results to be
beneficial in the long run.
For the second parameter set B, we can see that the worst-case robust formu-
lation uses initially an unnecessarily high control effort. Nevertheless, overall
the applied resources cpolicy differ by less than ∆u compared to the nominal
MPC, while the number of fatalities is still reduced by 33%. In comparison
to the open-loop policies, both MPC policies require less or equally restrictive
policy measures u, while the number of fatalities are significantly reduced.
6. Conclusions and Discussion
In the following, we summarize our findings on a high-level and highlight the
main take-away messages:
• Our results in Section 3 confirm the conclusions in [15] that neither eradi-
cation of the virus nor herd immunity without the availability of a vaccine
are viable solutions to handle the current COVID-19 outbreak.
• Applying an optimizer to the mathematical model describing the outbreak,
one can significantly reduce the number of fatalities without increasing the
costs associated to decreasing the infection rate (social distancing policies,
closing schools, etc.), compare Section 3.2.
• Since the proposed model can never exactly predict the COVID-19 pan-
demic, applying a nominal optimal policy introduces unnecessary conser-
vatism, at best, up to posing a great danger (i.e. overwhelming the health
care capacities risking high mortality rates). Therefore, our findings in
Section 4 support [15] by showing that any policy to control the COVID-
19 outbreak successfully has to be an adaptive strategy. This means we
need to constantly measure, monitor and estimate the current numbers
and adapt our policy accordingly, i.e., feedback is necessary for reliably
handling the outbreak.
• If we already a priori take into account that our model includes mismatches
and that all measured and estimated numbers are not exact and can have
a bias, we can further improve the outcome, as shown in Section 5. More
specifically, we developed a robust MPC-based feedback strategy using
interval arithmetic. The application of feedback without the robust de-
scription of the considered model can lead to intermediate increases in
the number of new infections necessitating another period of lockdown.
On the contrary, a robust feedback strategy can take these model mis-
matches and other uncertainties into account and is hence able to avoid
such behavior, thus significantly reducing the number of fatalities.
• When looking at the qualitative results the robust MPC-based feedback
offers, one can see that, accounting for the instability and uncertainty of
the spread of the virus, the controller suggests a rather strict policy at the
beginning and only then allows for a gradual increase in the infection rate.
Keeping this loosening slow at the beginning shows a beneficial effect in
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Figure 8: Different policies designed based on the nominal model identified in Section 2.2,
applied to the validation model with parameter set A (top) and parameter set B (bottom) with
biased state measurements: Open-loop optimal control strategy (’OL’, blue dotted), Open-
loop optimal control strategy with the same amount of resources as the robust MPC-based
feedback (’OL-resource’, red dashed), nominal MPC-based feedback strategy as in Algorithm 1
with biased estimated state xˆ(k) (yellow, dash-dot), robust MPC-based feedback strategy
using Algorithm 2 (purple, solid), and ICU capacity (black dotted).
the long run. This qualitative result of the robust MPC underpins also
the German policy and reaction to the outbreak of COVID-19 in Germany
where initially strong measures (what we here refer to as lockdown) were
applied. Only very recently the German government started to loosen
these measures slowly and gradually.
There are also influences on the course of the outbreak that were not taken
into account in the present paper but which are important in an overall strat-
egy towards the spread of COVID-19 (e.g. increasing testing capacities, track-
ing of infections, as well as investigating which measures lead to the desired
infection rate). However, controlling the infection rate is certainly one of the
key factors and hence, this paper contributes towards mitigating the spread of
COVID-19 under manageable societal and economic costs. We hope that the
proposed feedback strategies inspire further investigations in this direction and
offer qualitative and high-level insights that underpin the current policies or
strategy papers.
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Appendix A. Optimal control formulation using terminal constraints
In order to avoid artefacts of considering a finite-horizon problem (e.g. a
lot of infected people at the end of the horizon), an alternative to considering
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Figure A.9: Cautious baseline: Optimal control strategy with terminal constraints (blue,
solid), baseline policy (red, dashed) and ICU capacity (dotted, black).
the modified cost function F from (10) is the inclusion of additional terminal
constraints for the contagious population IDART = (I,D,A,R, T ) ∈ R5. In
particular, we require that at the end of the control horizon N , the number of
contagious individuals in each category (I,D,A,R, T ) should be smaller than
the corresponding number from the baseline policy (c.f. (A.1a)). In addition,
at the end of the horizon the number of contagious individuals should be non-
increasing, which is implemented as (A.1b).
Hence, in the following, we replace the cost F by the number of fatalities E,
and we add the following constraints to the optimal control problem (11) from
Section 3.2:
IDART (N · Ts) ≤ IDART
b(N · Ts), (A.1a)
IDART (N · Ts) ≤ IDART ((N − 1) · Ts). (A.1b)
Again, the index k in (11) corresponds to weeks and the states IDART (k · Ts)
correspond to the result of simulating the system (1) with the parameters
and initial condition from Section 2. These terminal conditions (A.1a)–(A.1b)
(which should be interpreted element-wise) ensure that the final state after the
finite horizon N is “better” than the baseline solution (c.f. (A.1a)) and the
outbreak can be contained (c.f. (A.1b)). The simulation results with the two
baseline policies shown in Figure A.9 and A.10 demonstrate that the termi-
nal constraints indeed effectively prevent the turnpike behavior. However, the
additional constraints also lead to a slight increase in the number of fatalities.
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Figure A.10: Aggressive baseline: Optimal control strategy with terminal constraints (blue,
solid), baseline policy (red, dashed) and ICU capacity (dotted, black).
Appendix B. Alternative average constraint formulation
We wish to briefly mention a stronger restriction on the societal cost of
the optimal control strategy. In particular, instead of only restricting the cost
over the considered horizon of N = 100 weeks, a stronger property is to en-
sure that at any time t, the previously accumulated policy cost is smaller than
the corresponding cost of the baseline policy. This can be done by replacing
condition (11d) with the following transient constraint:
i−1∑
k=0
cpolicy(u1(k)) ≤
i−1∑
k=0
cpolicy(u
b
1(k)), (B.1)
i = 1, . . . , N. (B.2)
The corresponding results for both baselines considered in Section 3.2 can be
seen in Figure B.11. In this case the number of fatalities are reduced by 33%
and 37%, respectively. Thus, also for this more restrictive setting, the optimal
controller can significantly reduce the number of fatalities. In addition, in the
comparison to the more aggressive baseline we also see that early measures are
absolutely crucial, since the two policies are essentially equivalent in the period
from 110 days – 150 days, i.e., including the critical time period where the ICU
capacity is exceeded, but differ significantly over 30 weeks prior to the violation
of the ICU capacity.
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Figure B.11: Transient constraint on social policy: Top: cautious baseline; Bottom: aggressive
baseline. Optimal control strategy (blue, solid), baseline policy (red, dashed) and ICU capacity
(dotted, black).
Appendix C. Interval predictions
In the following, we derive the dynamics of the interval predictions f, f
used in (14). Note that the following property holds for any scalars a ∈ [a, a],
b ∈ [b, b]:
a · b ∈ [ab, ab], (C.1)
if a, b ≥ 0. Furthermore, to ensure that x(t) ∈ [x(t), x(t)] given x(0) ∈ [x(0), x(0)],
we only require
x˙i ≥ x˙i if xi = xi, (C.2)
and similarly
x˙i ≤ x˙i if xi = xi, (C.3)
for all i = 1, . . . , 8. Essentially, we use the property (C.1) together with the
fact that xi and the parameters are positive to ensure that (C.2)and (C.3) hold
in order to derive the differential equations for the interval. More precisely,
assuming that every parameter is uncertain in some bounds (e.g. β ∈ [β, β])
yields the following 2 · 8 ODEs:
S˙ =− S(αI + βD + γA+ βR), (C.4a)
S˙ =− S(αI + βD + γA+ βR), (C.4b)
I˙ =S(αI + βD + γA+ βR)− (ǫ + ζ + λ)I, (C.4c)
I˙ =S(αI + βD + γA+ βR)− (ǫ + ζ + λ)I, (C.4d)
D˙ =ǫI − (ζ + λ)D, (C.4e)
D˙ =ǫI − (ζ + λ)D, (C.4f)
A˙ =ζI − (θ + µ+ κ)A, (C.4g)
A˙ =ζI − (θ + µ+ κ)A, (C.4h)
R˙ =ζD + θA− (µ+ κ)R, (C.4i)
R˙ =ζD + θA− (µ+ κ)R, (C.4j)
T˙ =µA+ µR− (σ(T ) + τ (T ))T , (C.4k)
T˙ =µA+ µR− (σ(T ) + τ (T ))T , (C.4l)
H˙ =λI + λD + κA+ κR+ σ(T )T , (C.4m)
H˙ =λI + λD + κA+ κR+ σ(T )T , (C.4n)
E˙ =τ(T )T , (C.4o)
E˙ =τ(T )T . (C.4p)
Since these dynamics only correspond to possibly conservative overapproxima-
tions, we can use
∑8
i=1 xi = 1 to possibly improve the resulting bounds for S
using the following projections: S ≤ 1 −
∑8
i=2 xi and S ≥ 1 −
∑8
i=2 xi. In
principle it would also be possible to directly set S, S using the other states
xi, xi instead of simulating (C.4a)–(C.4b), but this may not necessarily ensure
S ≤ 1 and S ≥ 0.
